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Abstract—As a blockchain platform that has developed vigorously in recent years, Ethereum is different from Bitcoin in that it
introduces smart contracts into blockchain. Solidity is one of the most mature and widely used smart contract programming language,
which is used to write smart contracts and deploy them on blockchain. However, once the data in the blockchain is written, it cannot be
modified. Ethereum smart contract is stored in the block chain, which makes the smart contract can no longer repair the code problems
such as re-entrancy vulnerabilities or integer overflow problems. Currently, there still lacks of an efficient and effective approach for
detecting these problems in Solidity. In this paper, we first classify all the possible problems in Solidity, then propose a smart contract
problem detection approach for Solidity, namely SolidityCheck. The approach uses regular expressions to define the characteristics of
problematic statements and uses regular matching and program instrumentation to prevent or detect problems. Finally, a large number
of experiments is performed to show that SolidityCheck is superior to existing approaches.
Index Terms—Ethereum; Smart Contract; Solidity Language; Regular Expressions
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1 INTRODUCTION
Ethereum is the largest blockchain that supports smart
contracts with a market capital of 18 billion [1]. Smart
contracts [2] are autonomous programs running on the
blockchain platform. They are usually developed in several
high-level languages and then compiled into bytecode. Once
the bytecode of smart contract is deployed to blockchain, its
functions can be invoked by others but the bytecode cannot
be changed. Unfortunately, it is inevitable that many smart
contracts contain bugs but they cannot be patched because
of the data immutability of blockchain [3], [4]. Consequently,
it is particularly important to have automated tools that
can help developers thoroughly check their smart contracts
before deploying their bytecode to the blockchain.
A number of recent studies report the possible issues in
smart contracts [5]–[10]. Base on existing work, we classify
them into three categories as listed in Table 1.
Security problems. Vulnerabilities in smart contract codes
cause developers to suffer losses. For example, DAO, the
largest crowdsourcing project in Ethereum, was found to
have a re-entrancy vulnerability in its code, resulting in the
loss of $12 million worth of ethers in 2016 [11].
Performance problems. This kind of problems increases
gas consumption for running contracts. Chen et al. [12]
analyzed the deployed smart contracts and found that more
than 80% of the smart contracts have performance related
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TABLE 1
Classification definition of smart contract problems
Types of problems Problem Description Severity
Security problem Vulnerabilities in contract code
cause developers to suffer losses
High
Performance
problem
Smart contract execution costs too
much or performs poorly due to
the use of certain statements
Medium
Hidden threats of
coding problems
Statements that may cause
security problems in specific
situations or reduce code
readability
Low
problems, even though the codes have been optimized by
the recommended compiler.
Hidden threats of coding problems. Statements that may
cause penitential security problems in specific situations or
reduce code readability are defined hidden threats of coding
problems. In general, these problems do not necessarily
cause serious problems. However, paying attention to these
problems and solving them can make smart contracts safer
and easier to maintain.
Some tools have been proposed to check the problems
aforementioned in smart contracts [2], [4], [7], [13]–[18].
However, most of them can only handle the bytecode of
smart contracts. Although processing bytecode directly em-
powers the tools to analyze all deployed smart contracts,
they cannot leverage the useful information in source codes
(e.g., naming functions and events) and consequently a
tool that can quickly and accurately locate the issues in
the source codes of smart contracts would be more useful
for the smart contract developers who have the source
codes at hand. Moreover, our experiments in Section 5.5.2
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2and other studies [2], [4], [7], [16] show that the bytecode
based tools are less efficient than tools for handling source
codes. Although a recent work [3] designed a tool (named
SmartCheck) for finding problems from the source codes of
smart contracts, existing work has the following limitations:
1) Existing vulnerability detection criteria is confusing.
They do not accurately characterize some problems.
For example, an external function call followed by
an internal function call is identified as having a re-
entrancy vulnerability, which could not accurately
capture the characteristics of re-entrancy vulnera-
bility and would cause a large number of misjudg-
ments and omissions.
2) SmartCheck cannot detect some important security
problems, such as integer overflow. Missing this
problem may lead to serious consequences. For
example, the integer overflow problem led to the
big loss of the BEC project.
3) The detection efficiency of the existing work is very
low. SmartCheck runs lexical and grammatical anal-
ysis on the Solidity source codes and then generates
the corresponding XML parse tree for the source
codes. Based on the parse tree, it uses XPath to re-
trieve the problematic statement [3]. Lexical analysis
and grammatical analysis reduce the efficiency of
SmartCheck analysis.
To address these limitations, in this paper, we propose,
SolidityCheck, a novel approach using regular expressions
to quickly and accurately locate 20 kinds of problems in
the source codes of smart contracts. In particular, we can
prevent two particularly dangerous security problems: (re-
entrancy and integer overflow). We also conduct exten-
sive experiments to evaluate the usability, efficiency and
effectiveness. In summary, we make the following novel
contributions:
• We propose a new classification criterion, which
identifies 20 kinds of code problems that have ad-
verse effects on smart contracts, including several
previously undetected ones, covering the vast ma-
jority of smart contract problems currently.
• We detect problematic statements through regular
expressions. Most kinds of problematic statements
can be accurately detected by regular expressions,
and then the test results can be reported to the user
for easy modification. Furthermore, two important
problems which are difficult to detect and have a
significant impact on the security of smart contracts
are retrieved by regular expressions, and then these
problems are prevented by program instrumenta-
tion.
• We particularly designed a set of experiments to
validate SolidityCheck. The experimental results show
that our tool is superior to the existing static code
analysis tools in recall, precision, and other indexes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides the basic concepts used in this paper. Section 3
proposes a novel classification criterion for smart contract
problems and discusses the characteristics of each problem.
We detail the design and the implementation of SolidityCheck
in Section 4. Section 5 reports our extensive evaluation
results of SolidityCheck. We discuss the limitations of Solid-
ityCheck in Section 6. After discussing the related work in
Section 7, we conclude the paper and point out the future
work in Section 8.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Smart contract
Smart contracts are computer programs that can automati-
cally execute contract terms [19]. Smart contracts are auto-
matically executed when their execution conditions are sat-
isfied, and the execution results are generated according to
the behaviors in the contracts. Using a smart contract to sign
a contract can effectively avoid disputes. Blockchain is well
suitable for the operating environment of smart contracts
because of its decentralization and network-wide consensus.
Ethereum smart contract accounts share the same address
space with the external accounts, and the smart contract can
be invoked by sending transactions to the contract address.
To prevent the unwarranted waste of Ethereum’s calculating
power, Ethereum collects gas from each executed smart
contract statement, which is converted from ethers.
2.2 Solidity
Solidity is the most mainstream, mature and widely used
Ethereum smart contract programming language [20]. Un-
like the lower-level language, Solidity is a Turing-complete
high-level programming language, which is capable of
expressing arbitrary complex logic. Smart contracts pro-
grammed in Solidity language are compiled into the
Ethereum virtual machine bytecodes and running in each
Ethereum node. Soliditylanguage is specially developed
for the compilation of Ethereum smart contracts. It con-
tains built-in functions to complete various functions of
Ethereum. For example, transfer and send functions are used
to execute transfer ethers, and keywords such as require
and assert are designed for checking status. Solidity is a fast
iterative language. The same keyword may have different
semantics in different language versions. To improve this
situation, when smart contracts in Solidity are written, it is
necessary to specify the versions of the compiler that the
contract can accept.
3 CLASSIFICATION OF EXISTING PROBLEMS IN
SMART CONTRACTS
Based on existing studies [3]–[10], we give a classification
criterion for smart contract problematic statements (see
Fig. 1 for detail), which summarizes 20 kinds of common
problems that need to be detected. Furthermore, we also
describe the consequences of each problem and the corre-
sponding detection approach we propose. The correspond-
ing regular expressions we designed for these detection
approaches are shown in appendix A.
3.1 Security Problems
Balance equality [3]. An adversary can forcibly send ethers to
the attacked contract by mining or via selfdestruct, so that
the conditional judgment part in Listing 1 is always false.
3Fig. 1. A classification criterion for smart contract problems
i f ( t h i s . balance == 1997 e ther ) {
//do something
}
Listing 1: balance equality
Mishandled exception [2]. In Ethereum, contracts can call
other contracts in several ways (eg., via send, delegatecall or
call [6]). If an exception occurs in the callee contract, the call
terminates, rolls back the status of the callee contract and
returns false. Therefore, the return value of an external call
should be checked to properly handle the exception [2], [5].
Listing 2 shows a possible loss scenario in which the contract
reduces addr’s holding of tokens when addr fails to receive
the transfer for some reasons.
addr . c a l l . value (1 wei ) ; // t r a n s f e r 1 wei to addr
balance [ addr ] −= 1 ; //reduce addr ’ s tokens
Listing 2: mishandled exceptions
DoS by external contract [3]. External contracts may be mali-
ciously controlled or killed, which may result in the invali-
dation of some or all functions of this contract. As shown
in Listing 3, when the dependent external contract self-
destructs, the function getService fails. It is particularly note-
worthy that when contracts depend on external libraries, the
security of libraries should be carefully reviewed.
func t ion g e t S e r v i c e ( address provider , address
customer ) publ ic{
Provider provider = Provider ( provider ) ;
// i f customer i s a user of the serv ice ,
//the customer can get s e r v i c e of the provider
i f ( provider . isCustomer ( customer ) ) {
//providing s e r v i c e
}
}
Listing 3: dos by external contract
Re-entrancy vulnerability [16]. The re-entrancy vulnerability
leads to the dissolution of The DAO and the division of the
Ethereum community. Source based code analysis cannot
accurately determine whether a statement or a piece of
codes introduces re-entrancy vulnerabilities. Listing 4 shows
a contract with a re-entrancy vulnerability (hereinafter re-
ferred to as an attacked contract). An attacker can write
a specific attack contract. He can first deposit ethers into
the attacked contract through the attack contract, and then
retrieve his deposit by calling withdrawBalance function in
the attacked contract. The fallback function of the attacking
contract calls again the withdrawBalance function of the
attacked contract, but now the balance of the attacking
contract has not deductions, consequently it can withdraw
many times.
pragma s o l i d i t y ˆ 0 . 4 . 1 5 ;
c o n t r a c t Reentrance{
mapping ( address => uint ) userBalance ;
4func t ion withdrawBalance ( ) {
//send userBalance [msg . sender ] e t h e r s to msg
. sender
// i f msg . sender i s a contrac t , i t responds
with the f a l l b a c k funct ion .
i f (msg . sender . c a l l . value ( userBalance [msg .
sender ] ) ( ) ) {
throw ;
}
userBalance [msg . sender ] = 0 ;
}
}
Listing 4: an smart contract with re-entrancy vulnerability
Using tx.origin for authentication [3]. tx.origin is different
from msg.sender (both keywords are provided in Solidity).
tx.origin points to the initiator of the transaction, while
msg.sender is the sender of the message. tx.origin always
points to the external account controlled by the user. As
shown in Fig. 2, for Contract C , Contract B is the msg.sender
of this call, and User A is the tx.origin of this call. Us-
Fig. 2. Differences between tx.origin and msg.sender
ing tx.origin for authentication, malicious users can easily
bypass authentication and steal ethers from the attacked
contract after cheating your trust. The contract in Listing
5 is authenticated using tx.origin. If the attacker induces
the victim to transfer ethers to the attack contract shown
in Listing 6 by various means, the attack contract can steal
all deposits of the contract in Listing 5.
c o n t r a c t Attacked{
address publ ic owner ;
c o n s t r u c t o r ( address owner ) {
owner = owner ;
}
func t ion withdrawAll ( address r e c i p i e n t ) publ ic{
requi re ( tx . o r i g i n == owner ) ;
r e c i p i e n t . t r a n s f e r ( t h i s . balance )
}
}
Listing 5: victim contract
import ” Attack . s o l ” ;
c o n t r a c t Attacker{
Attacked at tacked ;
address a t t a c k e r ;
c o n s t r u c t o r ( Attacked attacked , address
a t t a c k e r ) {
at tacked = at tacked ;
a t t a c k e r = a t t a c k e r ;
}
func t ion ( ) publ ic payable{
at tacked . withdrawAll ( a t t a c k e r ) ;
}
}
Listing 6: attack contract
Missing constructor. If the developer does not intend to write
constructor function, the harm of this problem is very lim-
ited (eg., incomplete contract structure). But if the developer
intends to write a constructor but write the wrong function
name, then any user can call the function (eg., contract
in Listing 7), which can cause serious security risks [8],
[10]. This paper recommends using constructor keyword to
declare constructors, which can effectively avoid the loss
caused by the misspelling of constructor names. We check
whether there is a constructor in each contract body.
pragma s o l i d i t y 0 . 5 . 0 ;
c o n t r a c t Foo{
address publ ic owner ; //owner i s the owner of
the c o n t r a c t
//Anyone c a l now be the owner of the c o n t r a c t
because the
//funct ion name i s misspel led .
funct ion foo ( ) publ ic{
owner = msg . sender ;
}
}
Listing 7: harm of misspelling constructor name
Locked money. If a contract needs to receive ethers, at least
any function in the contract should be declared as payable.
At the same time, at least one statement should be included
in the contract to enable the transfer ethers. Otherwise, all
ethers in the contract account will be locked and can never
be transferred.
Integer overflow. The integer overflow problem exists widely
in computer science. Because source based code analysis
cannot accurately determine which statement may cause
integer overflow, we adopt program instrumentation tech-
nique to prevent integer overflow through code insertion.
Unsafe type inference [3]. The keyword var is provided in
Solidity language, which automatically assigns types to vari-
ables. In Solidity, the type of variable is inferred to be the
smallest type of storage space that can accommodate the
initial value. As shown in Listing 8, the type of i is matched
to uint8, which is the type that can store an initial value
of 0 and require the smallest storage space. Using var as
a variable matching type can have security risks. The loop
shown in Listing 8 is an infinite loop, because uint8 can
represent a maximum value of 255, and more than 255 will
return to zero. In Ethereum, calls containing infinite loops
are not packaged into blocks.
f o r ( var i = 0 ; i <= 2 5 6 ; i ++){
//do something
}
Listing 8: infinite loop caused by unsafe type inference
3.2 Performance Problems
byte[ ]. byte[ ] can play the role of the byte array, but this is
a very wasteful storage space, which may lead to much gas
consumption [21]. The recommendation approach is to use
the bytes type.
Costly loop. The user of calling a contract can specify the
number of gases that this call carries before making the call.
5If gases are sufficient, the remaining gases will be returned
by Ethereum after the call is completed. If gases are insuf-
ficient, the call will fail and Ethereum will not return the
consumed gases. Loops that execute too many statements
can lead to excessive costs for a call, and transactions with
excessive costs may not be packaged into blocks, which
means that transactions will never succeed.
3.3 Hidden threats of coding problems
Timestamp dependence [22]. Miners can control the mining
time, thus gaining an unequal competitive advantage (eg.,
codes in Listing 9). Avoiding contract execution results
depends on environmental variables. If necessary, environ-
mental variables are costly to miners (eg., use block.difficulty).
Consequently, it is especially noteworthy that now and
block.timestamp should not be used as parameters of cryp-
tographic functions, so that the random number generated
will be controlled by miners.
i f (now % 2 == 0)
winner = addr1 ;
e l s e
winner = addr2 ;
Listing 9: guessing contract affected by miners
Token API violation [3]. Ethereum allows the distribution of
tokens. Before May 7, 2019, Ethereum had more than 100,000
token contracts. The ERC20, ERC721, and ERC165 [23]–
[25] token standards are currently popular token standards
that specify the most basic state variables, events, functions,
and function return types in token contracts. Throwing an
exception in some functions that return a Boolean value is
not recommended because throwing an exception prevents
the caller from getting a return value, which can lead to
dysfunction for the caller. When a function fails, it can tell
execution failure by returning a Boolean value.
Using fixed point number type. Solidity supports declaring
variables of fixed point number type, but it cannot assign
these variables or assign them to other variables [21], so
there is no need to use fixed point number type at all.
Private modifier [3]. The private keyword is provided in
Ethereum to indicate that the external visibility of a state
variable or function is private. But unlike other program-
ming languages, the use of private does not make state vari-
ables and functions invisible to the outside world. Miners
can view all the codes of the contract and the values of
state variables, consequently the password in Listing 10 is
available to the miner.
pragma s o l i d i t y ˆ 0 . 4 . 1 8 ;
c o n t r a c t Vault{
bytes32 p r i v a t e password ;
funct ion Vault ( bytes32 password ) publ ic payable
{
password = password ;
}
//Miners can take a l l the money of the c o n t r a c t
funct ion unlock ( address owner , bytes32
password ) publ ic{
i f ( password == password ) {
owner . t r a n s f e r ( t h i s . balance ) ;
}
}
}
Listing 10: visible password
Redundant refusal of payment [3]. Starting from Solidity 0.4.0,
contracts without the fallback function will reject payment
by default. This makes the function in Listing 11 redundant.
func t ion ( ) e x t e r n a l payable{
r e v e r t ( ) ;
}
Listing 11: redundant refusal of payment
Compiler version problem [3]. The ∧ operator is provided in
Solidity to specify that this contract accepts compilation of
the specified version number and its subsequent version
compiler. However, the future development trend of Solidity
is unpredictable and may lead to semantic changes of some
statements in future versions. In this way, we using the ∧
symbol should be avoided . Several methods for declaring
the compiler version are shown in Listing 12. The recom-
mended approach is to use the second or third.
pragma s o l i d i t y ˆ 0 . 5 . 0 ; //bad : 0 . 5 . 0 and above
pragma s o l i d i t y 0 . 5 . 0 ; //good : only 0 . 5 . 0
pragma s o l i d i t y >=0.5.0 <0 .6 .0 ; //bes t : 0 . 5 . 0 to
0 . 6 . 0
Listing 12: three ways to declare compiler versions
Style guide violation [3]. In the official development docu-
ment for Solidity, the declaration and definition of functions,
events, and arrays are standardized [21]. We think that the
function name shown in the second line of code in Listing 13
is inappropriate because the two function names in Listing
13 do not allow one to understand the difference between
their uses. It is recommended that function names begin
with lowercase letters, event names begin with uppercase
letters, and there is no space between type and left brackets
when array declarations are made.
//the nameing of twn f u n c t i o n s i s confusing
funct ion t r a n s f e r ( ) publ ic{ /∗do something∗/}
func t ion t r a n s f e r ( ) publ ic{ /∗do something∗/}
Listing 13: confusing function naming
Integer division. The support for floating-point and decimal
types in Ethereum is not perfect. All the results of integer
division are rounded down, the use of integer division to
calculate the number of ethers may cause economic losses,
so it is try to avoid integer division.
Implicit visibility level [3]. Although Solidity provides default
visibility for each type of variable and function, explicitly
specifying the visibility of each state variable and function
improves the readability of the code.
4 SOLIDITYCHECK
4.1 Overview of SolidityCheck
It is non-trivial to develop a tool that leverages regular
expressions to locate the problems described in Section 3
because of the following three reasons.
First, the format of the source codes may not be suitable
for the regular expressions, which usually handle code state-
ments written in one line, and different programming habits
make the source codes format different. The input source
codes needs to be formatted to facilitate regular expression
6Fig. 3. Overview of SolidityCheck
retrieval and matching. Consequently, we need implement
the appropriate formatting method.
Second, regular matching of every line of codes will
bring huge performance burden and make the retrieval
efficiency extremely poor. Because regular expressions are
usually based on the NFA (non-deterministic finite automa-
ton) engine and are implemented by the “matching back-
tracking” algorithm. However, NFA backtracking allows
it to access the same state multiple times (if it arrives at
that state through different paths). Therefore, in the worst
case, it may be very slow to execute and spend a lot of
CPU resources. To avoid the problem, we need to reduce
the number of code statements that need regular match-
ing without missing the problematic statements. We use
keyword filtering to reduce unnecessary regular matching
(statements with different kinds of problems always contain
different specific characters).
Third, regular expressions are only suitable for detecting
problems that exist within a single line of statements, but
they are powerless for problems that span multiple lines
of codes, such as costly loop. Some programming tricks are
needed to make the detection ability of regular expressions
span multiple lines. For example, we use bracket matching
to get the start and end positions of a loop statement.
The main process of SolidityCheck is divided into four
steps, shown in Fig. 3. The first step is formatting codes,
which enables regular expressions to easily detect the sen-
tence characteristics of each code, and improves detection
efficiency. The second step is keyword filtering, SolidityCheck
extracts statements that may contain problems according
to different keywords. Then, according to the functions
selected by users, the filtered codes are processed in the
third step, detection and prevention. In this step, problems are
detected or prevented according to the functions selected by
users. The final step is detection report and preventive contract,
in this step problems detection report or preventive contract
is output. The details of these steps are described in the
following four subsections.
4.2 Formatting Codes
The source code format of the smart contract is closely re-
lated to the programming habits of the developers, making
the source codes in a variety of formats. The format in
Listing 14 is Solidity’s official recommendation for function
header and its parameters declaration style. However, such
kind of source codes is extremely unfriendly for regular
expression matching because a complete statement has been
written in several lines. Consequently, before retrieving
the problematic statements, SolidityCheck pre-processes the
format of the source codes to write a sentence expressing
complete semantics in one line. In general, the criteria for
code formatting are described as follows:
1) All comments and blank lines in the original con-
tract are filtered. The extra spaces in the state-
ment are also eliminated. SoliditCheck first stores the
source codes in a string array by line, and then
checks each item in the array sequentially. If there is
a ”//” sub-string in one line, all comment characters
in that line are replaced by ” ” (including ”//”); if
there is a ”/*” sub-string in one line, all characters
are replaced by ” ” before the next ”*/” sub-string
appears, and then ”/*” and ”*/” substrings are also
be replaced by ” ”. After that, all comments in the
source codes are filtered out, and then SolidityCheck
discards all blank lines and transfers the processed
source codes to another string array.
72) Each formatted line of codes ends with a semicolon
(;) or a left bracket ({) or a right bracket (}). In Solid-
ity, the definitions of any contract header, function
header and function modifier header are marked
by left curly brackets ({) to end the statement, the
terminations of contract body, function body, and
function modifier body are marked by right curly
brackets (}), while any other statement ends with
semicolon (;). SolidityCheck gets the source codes
into a string, replaces all line breaks with ” ”,. Then
it scans the string sequentially, and adds a line break
characters after encountering left brackets ({), right
brackets (}) or semicolons (;). After this processing,
all statements except for-statement are written in
one line.
3) After the second step, a for-statement spans three
lines, which is not conducive to regular expression
matching. so the semicolon (;) in the for-statement
is specially handled. SolidityCheck retrieves the for-
statements, and then replaces the first two line
breaks characters in the for statement with ” ” so
that the for-statement is written in one line.
Listing 14 shows the codes before preprocessing, and
Listing 15 shows the codes after the same contract is pre-
processed. It is obvious that the number of lines of the
codes to be detected is significantly reduced, and the format
of the codes becomes easy for feature matching of regular
expressions.
func t ion deposi t (
address to ,
uint256 amount
) {
//Receiving address : to , Number : amount
userBalance [ to ] += amount ;
}
Listing 14: codes before contract preprocessing keywordstyle
func t ion deposi t ( address to , uint256 amount ){
userBalance [ to ] += amount ;
}
Listing 15: codes after contract preprocessing
4.3 Keyword filtering
Soliditycheck does not regular match every line of codes,
which greatly reduces the detection efficiency. We use key-
word filtering to improve detection efficiency. There are spe-
cific sub-strings in regular expressions that we used to de-
scribe the characteristics of various problematic statements.
A code statement that contains a certain type of string may
have a type of problem. Through keyword filtering, we
can effectively reduce the number of statements that need
regular matching without increasing missed judgment. We
illustrate keyword filtering with an example. The criteria
for costly loop problems is described as follows:
• The conditional part of for-statement or while-
statement contains function calls or identifiers.
• for-statement or while-statement with a maximum
number of statements executed exceeding 23 (The
reason is described in Appendix B) .
From the above criteria, we can conclude that for-
statements and while-statements may be costly loops and
statements that do not include “for” or “while” must not
be costly loops. Therefore, only the statements containing
the keywords ”for” and ”while” can be matched with the
features of costly loop problems.
4.4 Detection and Prevention
This step includes two sub-steps: detection and prevention.
For the detection step, we detect 18 kinds of problems
besides re-entrancy vulnerability and integer overflow. For
the prevention step, we use program instrumentation to
prevent the re-entrancy vulnerability and integer overflow
problem. The reason is that we cannot accurately detect
these two problems through regular expression matching,
but reporting all suspicious statements reduces the guidance
of the detection results. Consequently, SolidityCheck com-
bines regular expressions and program instrumentation to
achieve the purpose of prevention.
4.4.1 Detection
During the detection step, SolidityCheck matches problem-
atic statements using regular expressions. Soliditycheck dis-
tributes formatted codes to 18 problem detection classes,
each of which detects only one type of problems. In each
problem detection class, the formatting codes are stored
in an array of strings, and the program traverses line by
line. The program first filters the code statements to be
regularly matched by keywords filtering, and then matches
the filtered statements according to the different regular
expressions and corresponding detection rules we defined
for each problem. If there is a problem, the line number of
the codes is recorded, and the detection results of the 18
problem detection classes are summarized into a text file,
which is the detect report.
4.4.2 Prevention
Prevention is further divided into re-entrancy vulnerability
and integer overflow problems.
A. Re-entrancy vulnerability prevention.
During the re-entrancy vulnerability prevention step, So-
lidityCheck matches and inserts the codes using regular
expressions. Re-entrancy vulnerabilities are very special and
dangerous. According to the harm of re-entrancy vulnera-
bility, we divide re-entrancy vulnerability into the following
two categories:
1) Re-entrancy vulnerability with no ether transfer.
This kind of re-entrancy vulnerabilities is called
by a call to the fallback function of the contract,
carrying more than 2300 gas but not sending ether.
Such vulnerabilities can cause the attack contract to
repeatedly enter the attacked contract to perform
operations, which may cause the state variable to
be changed multiple times.
2) Re-entrancy vulnerability with ether transfer. This
kind of re-entrancy vulnerabilities are the most dan-
gerous, usually resulting in a total loss of contract
balance, and it has the following four characteristics:
a) Using call to transfer ethers.
8b) Unrestricted gas.
c) Deducing the balance after the transfer is
completed
d) Call does not specify which function of the
receiver will be called. Consequently, the
contract uses the fallback function to respond
to the transfer.
Detecting a line or a piece of codes does not mean accu-
rately detecting re-entrancy vulnerabilities. Current smart
contract detection tools cannot fully cover every re-entrancy
vulnerability in every contract. Unfortunately, missing any
re-entrancy vulnerability can cause a devastating blow to
the contract. At present, the main way to detect re-entrancy
vulnerabilities is to report every sentence that may intro-
duce re-entrancy vulnerabilities, but this may lead to a lot
of false positives and make the test results not instructive.
Our approach aims at the re-entrancy vulnerability with
ether transfer. First, we define the dangerous statement, which
is the source of the re-entrancy vulnerability. A statement
that contains the following three characteristics is called a
dangerous statement:
1) Using call to transfer ether.
2) Unrestricted gas.
3) Call does not specify which function of the receiver
will be called.
Dangerous statements are the source of re-entrancy vul-
nerabilities, but this does not mean that using dangerous
statements necessarily includes re-entrancy vulnerabilities.
Deducting the balance before the transfer can effectively
avoid re-entrancy attacks. Codes in Listing 16 can prevent
re-entrancy attacks.
1 funct ion withdrawBalance fixed ( ) {
2 //to p r o t e c t a g a i n s t re−entrancy , the s t a t e
v a r i a b l e
3 //has to be changed before the c a l l
4 uint amount = userBalance [msg . sender ] ;
5
6 userBalance [msg . sender ] = 0 ; // F i r s t ,
deduction
7
8 i f ( ! ( msg . sender . c a l l . value ( amount ) ( ) ) ) {
9 throw ; //After , t r a n s f e r
10 }
11 }
Listing 16: codes that effectively prevents re-entrancy keywordstyle
We use regular expressions to define dangerous state-
ments: statements that match feature 4.1 or feature 4.2.
(.) + (\.)(call)(\.)(value)(\()(.) + (\))(\()(\)) (4.1)
(.) + (\.)(call)(\.)(value)(\()(.) + (\))(\()(\′′)(\′′)(\))
(4.2)
Now we can match all the dangerous statements with
regular expressions. To prevent re-entrancy vulnerability,
we need to insert specially constructed statements at some
locations in the contract. The purpose of the insert state-
ments is to terminate the operation before the transfer if
there is transfer before deduction. The insertion statement
will not interfere with the normal operation of the contract
without the feature of first transfer and then deduction.
Second, for the convenience of describing the locations
of the insertion statements, the concept of the function call
chain is introduced. In Listing 17, function C contains re-
entrancy vulnerabilities, but it is an internal function and
cannot be invoked by an external contract. This does not
mean that the contract can be protected from re-entrancy
attacks, because an attacker can invoke function C by calling
function A, and can also launch re-entrancy attacks.
c o n t r a c t example 1{
mapping ( address => uint256 ) userBalance ;
func t ion A( ) publ ic{
B ( ) ;
}
func t ion B ( ) i n t e r n a l {
C( ) ;
}
func t ion C( ) i n t e r n a l {
msg . sender . c a l l . value ( 1 ) ( ) ;
userBalance [msg . sender ] −= 1 ;
}
}
Listing 17: call chain schematic code
Calls between functions constitute a call chain, and as long
as any function in the chain has re-entrancy vulnerabilities,
an attacker can achieve the effect of launching re-entrancy
attacks by calling the prefix function in the chain of the
function.
In our approach, function A is called chain-head function,
and function C is called chain-tail function. All chain-tail
functions are functions which contain dangerous statement.
Chain-tail functions are called direct call function, and other
functions in the chain are called indirect call function except
chain-tail functions.
By defining the call chain, we can accurately describe
where the prevention statements (we call the prevention
statements vaccines) are inserted.
Then, we define the ledger: the variable used to record
the correspondence between the address and the number of
tokens the address holds is called the ledger. There are many
variables in a contract that can act as a ledger, and due to
the lack of available tools to determine which variable is the
ledger. Therefore, we set the ledger as the mapping (address
=> uint256) variable of the first declaration in the contract,
which is based on our own experience.
Now, we describe the structure of 4 vaccines and the in-
sertion positions of different vaccines in table 2. The original
codes move backwards after insertion.
Table 3 explains the purpose of inserting four types of
code.
By inserting four vaccines, vaccines are able to abort and
roll back the operation on time if the contract used danger-
ous statements and contained the feature balance deducted
after transfer.
Because the re-entrancy vulnerability prevention func-
tion does not apply to all contracts (e.g., those contracts that
do not declare ledger), to facilitate use, we list the switch of
this function separately. In this way, developers can use it
according to their circumstances.
Besides, SolidityCheck inserts functions (named de-
posit test) into the contract. Calling the function in a private
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Insertion code composition and insertion location
Code type Composition structure Insertion position
A if(Bexe == 0) { Bexe =
ledger[etherReceiver];}
first line of direct
call functions and
first line of chain-
head functions
B Aexe = ledger[etherReceiver];
require(Aexe<Bexe);
The front line of
a dangerous state-
ment of direct call
functions
C Aexe = 0; Bexe = 0; The next line of
a dangerous state-
ment of direct call
functions
D uint256 Aexe = 0; uint256 Bexe
= 0;
First line of the
contract
TABLE 3
Insertion purpose of 4 kinds of codes
Code type Insertion purpose
A Number of tokens held at the ethers receiving
address at the beginning of the transfer business
B Using to obtain the number of tokens held at the
address of receiving ethers before the transfer
is initiated. If the number of tokens does not
decrease at this time, execution will be aborted
C Resetting Aexe, Bexe
D Declaring Aexe, Bexe
chain environment and sending enough ethers can achieve
the effect of detecting re-entrancy vulnerabilities (by observ-
ing the results of function execution).
B. Integer overflow problem prevention.
During the integer overflow problem prevention step, So-
lidityCheck matches and inserts the codes using regular
expressions.
The BEC project was officially launched on February
23, 2018, with a maximum market value of more than $28
billion. However, two months after its launch, the attacker
found that there was an integer overflow problem in the
BEC contract, and launched an attack against the problem,
leading to an unlimited issue of BEC tokens, which eventu-
ally triggered a wave of selling. The final result was that the
market value of BEC token was almost zero.
Listing 18 shows the BEC source codes [26] with an
integer overflow problem, and in line 3 there is an integer
overflow problem.
1 funct ion batchTransfer ( address [ ] r e c e i v e r s ,
uint256 value ) publ ic whenNotPaused re turns (
bool ) {
2 uint cnt = r e c e i v e r s . length ;
3 uint256 amount = uint256 ( cnt ) ∗ value ;
4 requi re ( cnt > 0 && cnt <= 20) ;
5 requi re ( value > 0 && balances [msg . sender ] >=
amount ) ;
6
7 balances [msg . sender ] = balances [msg . sender ] . sub (
amount ) ;
8 f o r ( u int i = 0 ; i < cnt ; i ++) {
9 balances [ r e c e i v e r s [ i ] ] = balances [
r e c e i v e r s [ i ] ] . add ( value ) ;
10 Transfer (msg . sender , r e c e i v e r s [ i ] , value ) ;
11 }
12 return true ;
13 }
Listing 18: BEC source code
Detection of integer overflow depends on logic analysis
and semantics understanding of codes. It is difficult to
determine that any integer operation statement has the risk
of integer overflow.
At present, the common method to prevent integer over-
flow in the Ethereum is to use SafeMath library 1 for integer
operation. In Listing 18, lines 7 to 9 use SafeMath library
functions for addition and subtraction. The SafeMath library
has several versions of implementations, and part codes
of the most popular implementation are shown in Listing
19 [27].
1 funct ion add ( uint256 a , uint256 b ) i n t e r n a l pure
re turns ( uint256 ) {
2 uint256 c = a + b ;
3 requi re ( c >= a , ”SafeMath : addi t ion overflow ” ) ;
4
5 re turn c ;
6 }
Listing 19: the part codes of SafeMath
The integer overflow prevention draws on the idea of Safe-
Math library. For each integer operation statement, different
verification codes are inserted before and after the statement
to verify whether the results of this integer operation is
correct, and the verification code can terminate in time after
the overflow occurs. It is equivalent to actively implement
the function of SafeMath library. When the program is imple-
mented, the program will not add the verification codes in
the SafeMash library to avoid unnecessary gas consumption.
First, SolidityCheck captures statements with the charac-
teristics of 4.3 or 4.4:
∧ (\s) ∗ (\w) ∗ (\s) + ((\w)|(\()|(\))|(\[)|(\])|(\.))
+ (\s) ∗ (\ =)(\s) ∗ ((\w)|(\()|(\))|(\[)|(\])|(\.))+
(\s) ∗ ((\+)|(\−)|(\∗)|(\/)|(\%))(\s) ∗ ((\w)|(\()|
(\))|(\[)|(\])|(\.)) + (\s) ∗ (; )$
(4.3)
∧ (\s) ∗ (\w) ∗ (\s) + ((\w)|(\()|(\))|(\[)|(\])|(\.))
+ (\s) ∗ (((\+)(\ =))|((\−)(\ =))|((\∗)(\ =))|((\
/)(\ =))|((\%)(\ =)))(\s) ∗ ((\w)|(\()|(\))|(\[)|(\]
)|(\.)) + (\s) ∗ (; )$
(4.4)
The sentence structure defined in Formula 4.3 is as follows:
ope1 = ope2(+| − | ∗ |/|%)ope3 (4.5)
The sentence structure defined in Formula 4.4 is as follows:
ope1((+ =)|(− =)|(∗ =)|(/ =)|(% =))ope2 (4.6)
For statements with different operations, the composi-
tion of the preventive codes inserted after the statement is
shown in Table 4.
Table 5 shows the two statement types and the code
inserted before the statement. Among them, the count part
of variable naming is an integer that grows by 1 for each
1. https://ethereumdev.io/safemath-protect-overflows/
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TABLE 4
The Corresponding Relation between Integer Operational Code and
Preventive Code(after)
Statement type Preventive code (after) composition
architecture
ope1 = ope2 + ope3; require(ope1 >= ope2);
ope1 = ope2− ope3; require(ope1 <= ope2);
ope1 = ope2 ∗ ope3; require(ope2 == 0||ope1/ope2 ==
ope3);
ope1 = ope2/ope3; require(ope3 > 0);
ope1 = ope2%ope3; require(ope3! = 0);
ope1+ = ope2; require(ope1 >= ope2);
ope1− = ope2; require(anti overflow temp count >=
ope2);
ope1∗ = ope2; require(ope2 == 0||ope1/ope2 ==
anti overflow temp count);
ope1/ = ope2; require(ope2 > 0);
ope1% = ope2; require(ope2! = 0);
TABLE 5
The Corresponding Relation between Integer Operational Code and
Preventive Code(before)
Statement type Preventive code (before) composition
architecture
ope1∗ = ope2; uint256 anti overflow temp count =
ope1;
ope1− = ope2; uint256 anti overflow temp count =
ope1;
insertion of code into a particular statement, starting from
1, to prevent repeated declarations of variables. If the code
is inserted before and after the integer operation code, the
variable names before and after the code correspond.
As with the function of preventing re-entrancy vul-
nerability, it is not appropriate to insert codes into each
tested contract (increasing gas consumption). Consequently,
we also list the functions of preventing integer overflow
separately, and users can choose according to their situation.
4.5 Detection Report and Preventive Contract
SolidityCheck outputs two different files depending on the
functionality selected by the user.
1) Detection report. That is the detection report of 18
kinds of problems besides re-entrancy vulnerability
and integer overflow problem.
2) Preventive contracts. A contract that prevents prob-
lems after inserting code.
A preventive contract is a contract after inserting codes base
on the original contract. SolidityCheck prints out the number
of lines of inserted codes to help users to know the location.
Listing 20 shows the specific format of the test report.
<Detect Report>
<Reporting information>
<Smart c o n t r a c t f i l e path/>
<Number of l i n e s of o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t code/>
<Detect ion time/>
<Tota l number of problematic s tatements/>
</Reporting information>
<D e t a i l s of the problem>
< Problem number/>
< Problem name/>
< Problem code l i n e number/>
< Problem d e s c r i p t i o n />
<Suggested modi f i ca t ions/>
</ D e t a i l s of the problem>
< !−− El iminate the d e t a i l s of the next 17
problems −−>
</Detect Report>
Listing 20: detection report format
Listing 21 shows a prevention contract (the original
contract: Reentrancy.sol from not-so-smart-contracts [28]). As
shown in listing 21, SolidityCheck does not insert codes in
function withdrawBalanc fixed2, the inserted codes prevent
the re-entrancy vulnerability in function withdrawBalance
and the inserted codes do not affect the execution of function
withdrawBalanc fixed, while the inserted function deposit test
detects the re-entrany vulnerability.
pragma s o l i d i t y ˆ 0 . 4 . 1 5 ;
c o n t r a c t Reentrance {
uint256 publ ic Aexe =0;
uint256 publ ic Bexe =0;
mapping ( address => uint ) userBalance ;
func t ion getBalance ( address u ) constant
re turns ( u int ) {
re turn userBalance [ u ] ;
}
func t ion addToBalance ( ) payable{
userBalance [msg . sender ] += msg . value ;
}
func t ion withdrawBalance ( ) {
i f ( Bexe ==0){
Bexe=userBalance [msg . sender ] ;
}
Aexe=userBalance [msg . sender ] ;
requi re ( Aexe<Bexe ) ;
i f ( ! ( msg . sender . c a l l . value ( userBalance [msg .
sender ] ) ( ) ) ) {
Aexe =0;
Bexe =0;
throw ;
}
userBalance [msg . sender ] = 0 ;
}
func t ion withdrawBalance fixed ( ) {
i f ( Bexe ==0){
Bexe=userBalance [msg . sender ] ;
}
uint amount = userBalance [msg . sender ] ;
userBalance [msg . sender ] = 0 ;
Aexe=userBalance [msg . sender ] ;
requi re ( Aexe<Bexe ) ;
i f ( ! ( msg . sender . c a l l . value ( amount ) ( ) ) ) {
Aexe =0;
Bexe =0;
throw ;
}
}
func t ion withdrawBalance fixed 2 ( ) {
msg . sender . t r a n s f e r ( userBalance [msg . sender ] ) ;
userBalance [msg . sender ] = 0 ;
}
func t ion d e p o s i t t e s t ( ) publ ic payable{
userBalance [msg . sender ]+=msg . value ;
withdrawBalance ( ) ;
withdrawBalance fixed ( ) ;
}
}
Listing 21: A contract to prevent re-entrancy vulnerability
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5 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
5.1 Research Questions
In this section, a series of experiments is conducted to
validate SolidityCheck based on a large amount of data sets
collected by us. The purpose of the experiments is to explore
the following four research questions:
• RQ1: Can SolidityCheck detect any smart contract
written in Solidity language and correctly output
detection reports?
• RQ2: Is SolidityCheck more efficient than similar
tools?
• RQ3: Is the detection quality of SolidityCheck better
than that of similar tools?
• RQ4: Can SolidityCheck prevents important vulnera-
bilities such as re-entrancy vulnerabilities and inte-
ger overflow problems?
We designed RQ1 to validate the usability of SolidityCheck.
RQ2 is used to investigate whether the detection efficiency
of SolidityCheck is higher than that of similar tools. RQ3 is
used to verify the detection quality of SolidityCheck. We use
recall and precision to judge the detection quality. RQ4 is
used to validate the effectiveness of our problem prevention
ability.
5.2 Experimental Data Set
Using Web crawler technology, we collected 1363 smart
contracts written in Solidity from the etherscan.io [29], to-
taling 1,239,927 lines of codes. To understand the size of the
contract in the data set, we counted the number of code lines
of each contract, and the results are shown in Table 6.
TABLE 6
Distribution of contract code lines
Size Number Proportion
0-500 699 51.3%
500-1000 334 24.5%
1000+ 329 24.2%
5.3 Contrast Tools
Based on the theory described in Section 4, we implemented
a tool named SolidityCheck for Solidity language, which is
now open source 2. Appendix C provides the implementa-
tion details of the tool.
To measure SolidityCheck’s capability, we select several
state-of-the-art tools for comparison. Because the software
and security engineering research community has relied
on free and open source software [10] for a long time,
we choose comparison tools from open source projects on
github [30]. According to their popularity, We select the
following eight tools:
1) Remix [31]. The Solidityintegrated development en-
vironment officially recommended by Ethereum. We
use the Solidity static analysis function of Remix.
2. https://github.com/xf97/SolidityCheck
2) Mythx [32]. Security analysis tool for EVM bytecode.
Supporting smart contracts built for Ethereum.
MythX uses Mythril and other non open source tools
like a static analysis tool - Maru and a greybox
fuzzer - Harvey, so it detects a wide range of vulner-
abilities. There are many implementations available
for Mythx, and we use Pythx (a library for the MythX
smart contract security analysis platform.).
3) Oyente [33]. The commonly used static code analysis
tool for Ethereum smart contracts was put forward
earlier in the same kind of tools [2].
4) Solhint [34]. Solhint is an open source project for lint-
ing Solidity code. This project provides both security
and style Guide validations.
5) Securify [35]. The project sponsored by the Ethereum
Foundation is a security scanner for Ethereum smart
contracts [16].
6) SmartCheck [36], Static code analysis tool for
Ethereum smart contracts [3].
7) ContractFuzzer [37]. The Ethereum smart contract
fuzzer for security vulnerability detection [22].
8) Osiris [38]. A tool to detect integer bugs in Ethereum
smart contracts [7].
5.4 Experimental Environment
Our experimental environment is a computer running
Ubuntu (Ubuntu 16.04) system. The memory is 32GB, the
CPU is Inter Xeon Silver 4108, and the GPU is NVIDIA
Quadro P4000. In the quality experiment, we installed differ-
ent versions of solc through docker and obtained the bytecode
file of each contract.
5.5 Experimental Results
5.5.1 Usability
To answer RQ1, we used the problem detection function of
SolidityCheck to test 1363 smart contracts and verify whether
SolidityCheck correctly outputs the detection report of each
smart contract. The experimental results show that Solidity-
Check correctly outputs the detection report of each smart
contract. Furthermore, we use the following indicators to
measure the proportion of problems in the experimental
data set. ContractsNumberthis problem is the number of con-
tracts containing one problem, and NumberOfTestContracts is
the number of contracts being tested.
Proportion =ContractsNumberthis problem/
NumberOfTestContracts
(5.1)
According to our experiments, most of the contracts have
problems, 61% of them have reported 10 or more problems.
Because the number of different problems varies greatly in
the data set, we present some maximal or minimal values
as follows: Compiler version problem–99.8%, Implicit visibility
level–82.1%, Using fixed point number type–0.1%, byte[ ]–0%,
Balance equality–0%, Unsafe type infefrence–0%. The propor-
tion of the remaining 11 problems in the data set is shown in
Fig. 4. Since most contracts do not introduce a new version
of the security specification statement into the contract, most
contracts are reported to contain this problem. The number
of the hidden threats of coding problems is also high.
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Fig. 4. The proportion of 12 problems in experimental data sets
Compared with security problems, the external visibility
of state variables and functions is trivial and less valued,
consequently, it is common in smart contracts. The last few
problems are about statements that are used less frequently,
or that most people know are wrong, and the number of
occurrences is very small. This is also in line with our
expectations before the test, and to some extent reflects the
credibility of SolidityCheck.
More importantly, SolidityCheck found two contracts
with re-entrancy vulnerabilities, 18 contracts with miner-
controlled random numbers and 10 contracts with locked
money. After our manual verification, all problems are true
and have not been reported before.
5.5.2 Efficiency
To answer RQ2, we design a series of experiments to record
the time consumed and also compare with other tools.
For bytecode-based tools such as Oyente, the measure of
detection efficiency is the average detection time of each
contract. For source-based tools such as SmartCheck, the
measure of detection efficiency is the number of lines of
codes detected per second. In this way, we design two
groups of experiments. In the first group, we used all
the tools to test the 50 contracts we randomly selected to
measure the average time each tool spent per contract. In the
second group, we used SolidityCheck and SmartCheck to test
the whole experimental data set and measure the number of
lines of codes per second for each tool.
Experiment 1. Because some of the tools have exceptions
when contracts are analyzed, and these exceptions can cause
analysis interruptions. Consequently, we use the quotient
of the total time and the number of contracts successful
analyzed as the average time. Table 7 shows the average
detection time for each tool to detect a contract. 3 4
Experiment 2. We define the following indicator to
measure the detection efficiency of different tools. The rps
value is a quotient of the total number of lines of codes for
all tested contracts and the total time consumed to test all
contracts.
rps =
∑
NumberOfLineseachContract/∑
timeConsumingeachContract
(5.2)
3. Remix: we count the run time of compilation and solidity static
analysis
4. Mythx: we use Pythx and only count runTime
The experimental result shows that SmartCheck takes 2491.33
seconds to test the whole experimental data set, while Solidi-
tyCheck takes 318.02 seconds. The rps values of the two tools
are shown in Fig. 5. The detection efficiency of SolidityCheck
is 683.4% higher than that of SmartCheck.
Fig. 5. Performance performance of SmartCheck and SolidityCheck
5.5.3 Quality
To answer RQ3, we design a series of experiments to
measure recall and precision of SolidityCheck. We randomly
selected 10 contracts from the entire experimental data set
as test cases to accurately measure the quality of each tool.
We determine the number of actual problems in each con-
tract by manual review. To ensure the accuracy of manual
review, we invite trained researchers to assist in identifying
problems in the contract.
First, several experimental indicators are defined, as
shown in Table 8. These indicators refer to:
• TP (True Positive) means the problem actually exists
and the tool report exists.
• FN (Fasle Negative) means the problem does not
exist but the tool report exists.
• FP (False Positive) means the problem actually exists
but the tool report does not exist.
For Ethereum smart contracts, missed judgment is much
more serious than misjudgment. Because smart contracts
are mostly hundreds of lines of codes, it is not difficult to
manually review each reported problem, but missing any
one of them could be a fatal blow to smart contracts.
Formulas 5.3 and 5.4 give the definition of recall and
precision of a single contract.
Recall rate = (TP )/(TP + FP ) (5.3)
Precision rate = (TP )/(TP + FN) (5.4)
The recall and precision for each tool are presented in
Table 9. In Table 9, the error means an error occurred when
the tool detected the contract so that it could not output
the analysis result, and the N/A represents the numerator is
zero.
We analyze the experimental results, SolidityCheck per-
forms best in recall, followed by SmartCheck. SmartCheck
and SolidityCheck are essentially static analysis approaches
based on source codes. The reason for the difference in
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TABLE 7
Average detecting time for a contract
ContractFuzzer Mythx Osiris Oyente Securify Remix SmartCheck Solhint SolidityCheck
time(s) 135.5 86.7 80.90 56.27 52.14 7.63 1.83 0.57 0.23
TABLE 8
Definitions of accurate detection, misjudgement and misjudgement
Actual existence Non-existence
Detect problem TP FN
Not detected FP TN
recall rate is that SolidityCheck’s problem detection crite-
ria are more accurate and reasonable, and consequently
SmartCheck may miss some statements that SolidityCheck
think are problematic. In terms of precision, SmartCheck is
the best (ContractFuzzer reports too few problems), followed
by SolidityCheck. The reason for the low accuracy of Solid-
ityCheck is that SolidityCheck’s checking strategy is biased
towards recall. SolidityCheck reports some statements with
vague characteristics of the problems, so there are relatively
more misjudgements. In general, we think that the higher
recall rate brings more benefits than the lower precision rate,
and the gap between SolidityCheck and SmartCheck is not
obvious (6.6%). Consequently, we think that the overall
detection quality of SolidityCheck is better.
5.5.4 Important Vulnerabilities
To answer RQ4, we design a set of experiments to detect
some important vulnerabilities, such as re-entrancy vulner-
ability and integer overflow problems. Because SolidityCheck
uses program instrumentation to detect these two problems
while the other contrast tools only scan codes, to unify
evaluation indicator, we use the following criteria for the
“effectiveness” of different tools:
• For SolidityCheck, inserted codes effectively prevent
problems from occurring.
• For other tools, the correct location of the problem
was reported.
The first experiment is performed for the re-entrancy
vulnerability problem. We used Reentrancy.sol of not-so-
smart-contracts [28] and Reentrance.sol of Ethernaut [39] as
test cases, both of which are representative and problematic
smart contracts. Y represents the effective response of the
tool, and N represents not, and we use N/A to flag a tool
to analyze the contract failure. The experimental results are
shown in Table 10.
It is noteworthy that Securify reports that all statements
that use call instruction to send ethers may introduce re-
entrancy problems. Remix reports that all transfer statements
that do not comply with the CEI (Checks-Effects-Interaction)
mode may introduce re-entrancy vulnerabilities, even if the
statement uses transfer instructions to send ethers.
In the second experiment, we use the inte-
ger overflow 1.sol (Abbreviation:Interger.sol) contract of
not-so-smart-contracts project [28], Token.sol of Ethernaut [39]
and the BEC contract (Abbreviation:BEC.sol) source
code [26] as test cases. BEC contract is the smart contract
that has lost the most because of the integer overflow
problem so far. The experimental results are shown in
Table 11. Y represents the effective response of the tool,
while N represents not, and we use N/A to indicate that a
tool occurs a failure when the contract is analyzed.
It can be seen from the experimental results. For re-
entrancy vulnerabilities problem, Securify, Remix, and So-
lidityCheck have responded effectively. For integer overflow
problems, only SolidityCheck effectively handles all integer
overflows and Mythx misses one. Listing 22 shows the codes
inserted into the BEC contract by SolidityCheck. The codes in
line 3 inserted by SolidityCheck effectively prevents the inte-
ger overflow problem in line 2, which is the exact problem
statement that causes the attack of the BEC contract.
1 uint cnt = r e c e i v e r s . length ;
2 uint256 amount = uint256 ( cnt ) ∗ value ;
3 requi re ( uint256 ( cnt ) ==0 | | amount/uint256 ( cnt ) ==
value ) ;
Listing 22: the part of codes after inserting code into the BEC contract
5.5.5 Answers to Research Questions
We designed a set of experiments to obtain the answers for
the four research questions raised in Section 5.1. Now, based
on our experimental results, we give corresponding answers
to these questions.
• Answer1: SolidityCheck can generate detection results
for any smart contract developed in Solidity language
without restricting the programming style and lines
of codes of the contract under test.
• Answer2: SolidityCheck spends the least time among
all tools. In comparison with SmartCheck, the detec-
tion efficiency of SolidityCheck is also significantly
better than that of SmartCheck.
• Answer3: According to the problematic statement
standard defined by us, SolidityCheck is significantly
better than the contrast tools in recall rate, while
SolidityCheck lags behind SmartCheck in precision rate
only a little. But for smart contracts, recall is far
more important than precision, and we think that
the overall detection quality of SolidityCheck is better
than similar tools.
• Answer4: In our experiments, SolidityCheck is the only
tool that can resist both re-entrancy vulnerabilities
and integer overflow problems.
6 DISCUSSION
Source code analysis pursues detection efficiency and prob-
lem recall rate. Our desire is to bring better user experience
and more complete security for smart contract developers.
However, SolidityCheck still has its own shortcoming in its
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TABLE 9
Comparative results of recall and precision for different tools
Test
case
ContractFuzzer Mythx Osiris Oyente Securify Remix SmartCheck Solhint SolidityCheck
1
TP/FP/FN 0/37/0 1/36/1 error error 0/37/4 19/18/2 21/16/0 0/37/0 37/0/1
recall(%) 0 2.7 N/A N/A 0 51.4 56.8 0 100
precision(%) N/A 50 N/A N/A 0 90.47 100 N/A 97.4
2
TP/FP/FN 0/4/0 1/3/2 error error 0/4/1 0/4/2 4/0/0 0/4/0 4/0/4
recall(%) 0 25 N/A N/A 0 0 100 0 100
precision(%) N/A 33.3 N/A N/A 0 0 100 N/A 50
3
TP/FP/FN 0/5/0 0/5/10 error error 0/5/1 0/5/0 1/4/1 0/5/0 3/2/0
recall(%) 0 0 N/A N/A 0 0 20 0 60
precision(%) N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A 100 N/A 97.4
4
TP/FP/FN 0/79/0 0/79/1 error error 0/79/2 1/78/1 42/37/4 0/79/0 79/0/8
recall(%) 0 0 N/A N/A 0 1.3 53.2 0 100
precision(%) N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 50 91.3 N/A 90.8
5
TP/FP/FN 0/28/0 1/27/0 0/28/0 0/28/3 0/28/0 0/28/0 19/9/0 0/28/0 27/1/1
recall(%) 0 3.6 0 0 0 0 67.9 0 96.4
precision(%) N/A 100 N/A 0 N/A 0 100 N/A 96.4
6
TP/FP/FN 0/4/0 1/3/1 error error error 2/2/2 2/2/2 0/4/0 4/0/8
recall(%) 0 25 N/A N/A N/A 50 50 0 100
precision(%) N/A 50 N/A N/A N/A 50 50 N/A 33.3
7
TP/FP/FN 0/8/0 1/7/2 error error 0/8/2 1/7/1 4/4/0 0/8/0 7/1/2
recall(%) 0 12.5 N/A N/A 0 12.5 50 0 87.5
precision(%) N/A 33.3 N/A N/A 0 50 100 N/A 77.8
8
TP/FP/FN 1/19/0 3/17/0 error error 0/20/1 0/20/2 6/14/0 0/20/0 17/3/1
recall(%) 5 15 N/A N/A 0 0 30 0 85
precision(%) 100 100 N/A N/A 0 0 100 N/A 94.4
9
TP/FP/FN 0/45/0 0/45/0 error error 0/45/1 0/45/0 18/27/2 0/45/0 45/0/0
recall(%) 0 0 N/A N/A 0 0 40 0 100
precision(%) N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A 90 N/A 100
10
TP/FP/FN 0/2/0 1/1/0 error error 0/2/1 0/2/0 1/1/0 0/2/0 2/0/2
recall(%) 0 50 N/A N/A 0 0 50 0 100
precision(%) N/A 100 N/A N/A 0 N/A 100 N/A 50
Overall
TP/FP/FN 1/231/0 9/223/7 0/232/0 0/232/3 0/232/13 23/209/10 118/114/9 0/232/0 225/7/27
recall(%) 0.43 3.9 0 0 0 9.9 50.9 0 97.0
precision(%) 100 56.25 N/A 0 0 69.7 92.9 N/A 86.3
TABLE 10
Experiment results of re-entrancy vulnerability
Solhint SmartCheck Mythx Oyente Osiris Securify ContractFuzzer Remix SolidityCheck
Reentrancy.sol N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Reentrance.sol N N N N/A N/A N/A Y Y Y
current state. We summarize the existing problems and the
corresponding solutions in the following:
1) SolidityCheck cannot feedback detection information,
which makes developers have to use the editor
again to modify the problematic statement after the
detect results are gotten, which brings bad user
experience. We plan to make the feedback of So-
lidityCheck’s detect results timely and in a more
convenient way in the future.
2) The rapid development of smart contract field has
brought endless security accidents and a large num-
ber of related literature. Many smart contract prob-
lems that we do not find at the beginning are dis-
covered now. Based on our capabilities, we cannot
always keep updating our target problems set while
studying SolidityCheck, which makes it impossible
for SolidityCheck to detect some smart contract prob-
lems. We plan to continue updating SolidityCheck
in the future so that it can detect more types of
problems.
3) Source code based analysis can bring a good prob-
lem recall rate, which is very important for smart
contracts. However, this does not mean that accuracy
rate should be ignored, the low accuracy rate may
make the results of SolidityCheck not instructive. In
the following study, we will provide more accurate
regular expressions, more technical means to con-
tinuously enhance the accuracy of SolidityCheck.
4) Our re-entrancy vulnerability prevention approach
can address the most dangerous type of re-entrany
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TABLE 11
Experimental results of integer overflow problem
Solhint ContractFuzzer Securify Remix SmartCheck Mythx Oyente SolidityCheck Osiris
BEC.sol N N N N N N N Y Y
Integer.sol N N N N N Y Y Y Y
Token.sol N N N N N Y Y Y Y
vulnerability (re-entrancy vulnerability with ether
transfer), but it does not mean that another type of
re-entrancy vulnerability (re-entrancy vulnerability
with no ether transfer) can be ignored. We plan to
further study new approach to detect or prevent this
type of re-entrancy vulnerability in the future.
7 RELATED WORK
7.1 Safety status of smart contracts in Ethereum
Some researchers focus on investigating on the security
status of Ethereum smart contracts. According to their
study, we can understand the worrying security status of
Ethereum smart contracts. Destefanis et al. [40] investi-
gated the freezing accident of parity wallet in Ethereum,
put forward the smart contract programming mode which
should be avoided centrally, and finally put forward the
necessity of building block chain software engineering.
Atzei et al. [20] analyzed the academic literature, blogs and
forums in the field of smart contract security in Ethereum,
combined with their programming experience, expounded
the vulnerabilities of Ethereum and its mainstream smart
contract programming language (Solidity), and proposed
the classification of common programming vulnerabilities
that may lead to vulnerabilities. Nikolic´ et al. [4] described
vulnerabilities in smart contracts as traceable attributes, and
tried to find greedy (locked money), prodigal (which may
leak ethers to any user) and suicidal (which can be killed
by anyone) smart contracts through cross-contract symbolic
analysis and verification. They implemented MAIAN, and
with this tool, they succeeded in finding vulnerabilities in
parity wallet. Wang et al. [41] proposed a research frame-
work for smart contracts based on a six-layer architecture
and described the problems existing in smart contracts in
terms of contract vulnerability, limitations of the blockchain,
privacy, and law. Through interviews with smart contract
developers, Zou et al. [42] revealed that smart contract
developers still face many challenges when developing con-
tracts, such as rudimentary development tools, limited pro-
gramming languages and Ethereum virtual machines, and
difficulties in dealing with performance issues. However,
in our opinion, these studies do not propose an effective
classification criterion for smart contract problems, a general
classification criterion for Solidity language is still lacking.
7.2 Ethereum virtual machine bytecodes
Analyzing the security of smart contracts based on the byte-
codes of the EVM (Ethereum virtual machine) is the main-
stream methods at present. Grishchenko et al. [13] proposed
the first small semantics of EVM by formalizing bytecodes,
obtained executable codes, and successfully verified the
official EVM test suite. Luu et al. [2] used attribute analysis
to verify the security of smart contracts and developed
Oyente to detect security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
Albert et al. [14] introduced the advanced validation engine
used to validate the C language program into the security
validation of smart contracts, validated the security of con-
tracts through the C language program validation engine,
and finally output a report with validation results. Their
work bridges the gap between today’s advanced C-program
verification technology and the security of Ethereum smart
contracts. Tann et al. [15] used machine learning technology
to detect security vulnerabilities in smart contracts. The
approach uses LSTM (Long Short-Term Memory) network
to learn the behavior pattern of smart contract bytecodes,
and thus obtains better detection accuracy than the MAIAN
tool developed by Nikoli’c et al. [4]. Torres et al. [7] realized
the integer defect detection tool Osiris of Ethereum smart
contract through symbol execution and pollution analysis.
The tool can detect arithmetic errors, truncation errors, and
signature errors. As far as we know, this tool is one of the
few Ethereum smart contract analysis tools that can handle
integer errors. Tsankov et al. [16] analyzed the bytecodes of
Ethereum virtual machine, obtained the exact semantics of
the statement, and judged the security of smart contracts.
Based on semantics, a tool called Securify is realized, which
can scan the security of Ethereum smart contract. Chen et
al. [17] focused on the execution cost of Ethereum smart
contracts. Through investigation and analysis, they found
that many recommended smart contract compilers generate
bytecodes that contain expensive patterns, even though
these bytecodes have been optimized. To this end, they pro-
posed and developed Gasper, a symbol-based execution tool
for detecting expensive patterns in bytecodes. Bragagnolo
et al. [18] realized SmartInspect, a smart contract debugging
tool, by analyzing the bytecode distribution in the Ethereum
virtual machine memory.
Various analysis methods based on the bytecodes of
the Ethereum virtual machine can accurately detect se-
curity vulnerabilities in contracts. However, the detection
efficiency of them is relatively low, and they do not adapt
quickly to Ethereum updates. Furthermore, these methods
cannot accurately locate the possible issues in the source
codes of smart contracts.
7.3 Smart contract static code analysis
Static code analysis based on contract source codes has
high problem coverage and detection efficiency, and can
also detect problems that affect the readability of the codes.
It is a useful supplement to the methods based on EVM
bytecode. To the best of our knowledge, only Tikhomirov
et al. [3] have done some research on static code analysis
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based on the source codes of the Ethereum smart contract.
They classify and summarize the existing Ethereum smart
contract problems, and use lexical analysis, grammar analy-
sis and other technologies to achieve static code analysis of
smart contracts. However, their problem detection criteria
are not very accurate, and cannot detect important secu-
rity problems such as integer overflow problems and re-
entrancy vulnerabilities which have a significant impact on
the security of smart contracts.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
With the vigorous development of blockchain technology,
the Ethereum smart contract has been paid more and more
attention. In this paper, we propose a novel approach,
namely SolidityCheck to detect Ethereum smart contract
problems based on regular expressions and program in-
strumentation. A series of experiments show that the tool
corresponding to SolidityCheck has more advantages than
existing ones in terms of detection quality and efficiency,
and SolidityCheck is can deal with important issues of smart
contracts such as re-entrancy vulnerabilities and integer
overflow problems.
For future work, we have the following plans:
• Determining a comprehensive, reasonable, accurate
and up-to-date code problem criterion for Ethereum
smart contract.
• According to the criterion of Ethereum smart con-
tract problems, the problems that cannot be detected
by SolidityCheck can be added to SolidityCheck in the
future.
• Continuously optimizing SolidityCheck to further im-
prove detection quality, performance, and stability.
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APPENDIX A
PROBLEMS AND THEIR CORRESPONDING REGULAR
EXPRESSION
We introduce the matching rules for SolidityCheck here:
• Balance equality. SolidityCheck matches the statement
with the characteristics of formula 2.1.
• Mishandled exceptions. SolidityCheck matches the state-
ment with the characteristics of formula 2.2.
• DoS by external contract. SolidityCheck matches state-
ments with characteristics of formula 2.3 or 2.4.
• Using tx.origin for authentication. SolidityCheck
matches the statement with 2.5 characteristics.
• Missing constructor. SolidityCheck detects whether the
contract contains statements with 2.6 or 2.7 charac-
teristics, and reports the line number of the contract
header if no.
• Locked money. SolidityCheck first detects whether the
contract contains statements with the 2.8 characteris-
tics. If so, SolidityCheck detects statements with 2.9 or
2.10 characteristics in the non-inline assembly code,
and detects statements with 2.11 characteristics in the
inline assembly code, if such statements do not exist
(2.9, 2.10, 2.11), SolidityCheck reports this problem.
• Unsafe type inference. SolidityCheck detects the state-
ment with the 2.12 characteristics and requires the
number to the right of the ”=” to be less than 2198
and greater than (-2)197. Because of beyond these
two boundary values, variables are matched to the
type in Solidity that has the largest storage space for
shaping.
• byte[ ]. SolidityCheck matches the statement with 2.13
characteristics.
• Costly loop. SolidityCheck detects statements with the
2.14-2.19 characteristics, these formulas define loops
that contain identifiers or function calls in the con-
ditional judgment part of a for-statement or while-
statement. In addition, loops with a maximum execu-
tion of more than 23 sentences will also be considered
costly loops (we explain why in appendix B).
• Timestamp dependence. SolidityCheck matches the state-
ment with 2.20 characteristics.
• Token API violation. In our detection, firstly, the regu-
lar expression 2.21 matches the contract or interface
whose name contains ERC20, ERC721, and ERC165.
If there is a statement that conforms to the above
characteristics, the contract is considered to be devel-
oped by following one of ERC20, ERC721 or ERC165,
and the contract or interface of the token standard is
declared as ERC contract. Then, in all contract codes
directly or indirectly inherited from the ERC contract,
the pattern detects whether there are any exception-
causing codes (using require, assert, throw, revert())
in functions with type 2.22 characteristics. If there
is, it is identified as a problem; if not, there is no
problem.
• Using fixed point number type. SolidityCheck matches
the statement with the characteristics of formula 2.23.
• Private modifier. SolidityCheck detects statements with
2.24 characteristics but without 2.25 characteristics.
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• Redundant refusal of payment. When the compiler ver-
sion is higher than 0.4.0, regular expression 2.26 rep-
resents the fallback function that receives an external
payment and we detect in the body of the function
whether to use revert() or throw. If so, there is a
problem.
• Compiler version problem. SolidityCheck detects state-
ments that have characteristics of type 2.27, or state-
ments that have characteristics of type 2.28 but do not
contain the ”<” symbol. In this problem, to promote
the popularity of the newer version of security spec-
ifications, the pattern retrieves whether the contract
contains statements with 2.29 characteristics. If not,
its considered a problem.
• Style guide violation. SolidityCheck detection has one of
the characteristics of formula 2.30, 2.31 and 2.32.
• Integer division. SolidityCheck matches the statement
with the characteristics of formula 2.33.
• Implicit visibility level. SolidityCheck detects statements
that have one of the characteristics of 2.34 to 2.40, but
do not have the characteristics of type 2.41.
Please refer to the regular expressions in the table on the
page 21 for detail.
APPENDIX B
MORE PRECISE “COSTLY LOOP” PROBLEM
Tikhomirov et al. [3] proposed the definition of costly loop
problems, and proposed the corresponding detection crite-
ria for “costly loop” problems:
• “for”-statements with function calls or identifiers in
the conditional part.
• “while”-statements with function calls in conditional
part.
In other words, the statements shown in Listing 1 are not
considered as a costly loop. But the loop will have 20000
statements executed. In fact, such a loop must be expensive,
and, likely, it will not be packaged into any block.
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < 10000 ; i ++){
i f (msg . sender == r e c e i v e r 1 )
msg . sender . t r a n s f e r (1 wei ) ;
}
Listing 1: costly loop
The reason for these omissions is that Tikhomirov et
al’s criteria [3] do not take into account that the maximum
number of loops is a fixed value. To reduce such omissions,
we need to address the following two issues:
1) In current Ethereum, how much gas spent can be
considered an expensive transaction?
2) If all statements executed by a contract call are in
a loop, how many statements executed by the loop
will make the call an expensive transaction?
To get the answers for these two questions, we need to
obtain the following three values:
1) How much gas consumed can be called an expen-
sive transaction?
2) How much gas does a statement consume on aver-
age in a loop?
3) How to get the maximum execution statement num-
ber of a loop?
To this end, we carry out the following statistical analy-
sis.
Let,
• the total daily gas consumption be G,
• the gas consumption per transaction be g,
• the number of transactions per day be n.
Then G, g and N satisfy the following formulas:
G =
n∑
i=1
g (2.1)
The average gas consumed per transaction per day AG
satisfies the following formulas:
AG = G/n (2.2)
By collecting daily gas consumption and daily trading
volume from Ethereum from January 1, 2019, to May 7, 2019,
we get the value of AG, as shown in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6. Average gas consumption per transaction per day
We use SPSS [?] software to generate a normal Q-Q graph
of AG data. The result shows that the data points are evenly
distributed on both sides of the normal distribution line.
Therefore, it is considered that AG data conform to normal
distribution. The analysis results are shown in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7. Normal Q-Q Diagram Generated by SPSS
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According to the nature of normal distribution, let:
• the expectation be E.
• the standard deviation be D.
The transactions consuming gases less than (E+D) account
for 84.3% of the total transactions.
TABLE 12
Partial information on AG values
Sample size 127
Average value 64212.5996
Standard deviation 5087.94154
Minimum 55238.50
Maximum 75442.82
A transaction that consumes gases more than the sum of
an expectation and a standard deviation is set as an expensive
transaction. The reason is that 84.3% of the transactions
consumed gas below that value.
Table 12 contains the analysis information of AG data.
According to the analysis data, the criterion for expensive
transactions is the consumption of more than 69301 gases.
The number of gases consumed by various statements is
specified in detail in [?].
According to the possibility of different kinds of sen-
tences appearing in a loop, this paper divides 36 kinds of
sentences into three levels, namely:
• Types of statements frequently used in loops
• Types of statements occasionally used in loops
• Types of statements that are not possible to use in
loops
We divide 36 statements into three categories and the
results are shown in Table 13.
Based on this table, we get the following formula by
setting the weight of frequently used sentences to x and
the weight of occasionally used sentences to y.
14x+ 17y = 1 (2.3)
x > y (2.4)
For the solutions of (2.3) (2.4), we choose a reasonable
solution from multiple solutions:
x = 0.052, y = 0.016
According to the number of gases consumed by different
kinds of statements and the weight of different statements.
Let,
• ave gas be the average gas consumed by each state-
ment in a loop,
TABLE 13
Classification of Frequent Use of 36 Sentences in Loops
Frequently Occasionally Impossible
14 17 5
• w be the weight of each statement,
• gas be the number of gases consumed by each state-
ment.
Then we get following formula:
ave gas =
36∑
n=1
gas ∗ w (2.5)
According to the above formula, the average gas consump-
tion per statement in a loop is 2928 gas.
Let,
• A loop executes at most Lmax statements.
• A loop runs at most C times.
• A loop executes up to L statements at a time.
The relationship between the above three is as follows:
Lmax = C ∗ L (2.6)
By definition, the maximum number of statements executed
by a loop is 24 in Listing 2.
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < 1 2 ; i ++){
my balance += 1 ;
sender balance −= 1 ;
}
Listing 2: A loop that executes 24 statements
We assume that if all statements executed by a call
are statements in a loop, and the loop header statements
execution does not consume gas, a loop that conforms to
the following formula will be judged as a costly loop. Let,
• the gas standard of expensive transaction consump-
tion be Cexp.
• the maximum number of statements executed in a
loop be Lmax.
• the average gas consumption of each statement be
Gave.
So the formula is as follows:
Gave ∗ Lmax ≥ Cexp (2.7)
Based on the above calculation, when the maximum number
of statements executed in a loop is more than 23, it will be
judged as a costly loop (The standard is adjustable).
APPENDIX C
SOLIDITYCHECK
According to the theoretical description, we implement So-
lidityCheck, a static code analysis tool for Ethereum smart
contracts written by C++. SolidityCheck first formats the
codes, and then detects the formatted code. SolidityCheck
consists of several classes, each of which is responsible
for detecting or preventing only one problem. For each
statement, each class filters keywords first, and if it con-
tains a specific keyword, It matches statements (we use the
regex library in the C++ standard library to match). For
statements with the problem characteristics described by
regular expressions, SolidityCheck records the line number of
the problem statement (Line numbers refer to the formatted
code file).
For some problems that cannot be judged by one line
of statement, we use some programming tricks to make
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the detection ability of regular expressions span multiple
lines. For example, in the case of costly loop, we use bracket
matching to get the maximum number of statements that
are executed once by a loop, while regular expressions are
used to detect for-statements or while-statements that may be
problematic. Of course, most of the problem types detected
by SolidityCheck can be detected in one line after code
formatting, which is why we use regular expressions and
determine code formatting standards. For some problems
involving several statements, we do use some programming
tricks to enable SolidityCheck’s detection capability to span
multiple lines.
In our experiments, SolidityCheck can cover nearly every
sentence that we believe is problematic, which also proves
the completeness of SolidityCheck’s cross-statement detection
ability.
To prevent problems, SolidityCheck first retrieves state-
ments that may introduce problems through regular ex-
pressions and then inserts code before and after statements
through string splicing. Adding line breaks in string splicing
will eventually achieve the effect of inserting codes before
and after the problem statement in the output file.
SolidityCheck provides seven functions, which are used
from the CLI (command line interface). The functions and
corresponding commands are as follows:
1) Getting help information —- SolidityCheck --help
2) Generating contracts to prevent re-entrancy vulner-
abilities —- SolidityCheck --r
3) Generating contracts to prevent integer overflow
problems —- SolidityCheck --o
4) Detecting of 18 other problems except integer over-
flow and re-entrancy vulnerabilities —- Solidity-
Check --d
5) Adjusting costly loop standard —- SolidityCheck --g
6) Checking existing expensive cycling standards —-
SolidityCheck --s
7) Batch testing —- SolidityCheck --f
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Problem name Regular expressions Number
Balance equal-
ity
∧(\s)((if)|(while)|(require))(\s)∗(\()(.)∗(((this.balance)(\s)∗(==)(\s)∗(\d))+(ether))|((\d)+(\s)∗
(ether)(\s) ∗ (==)(\s) ∗ (this.balance)))(.) ∗ (\))(.) ∗ $
(2.1)
Mishandled ex-
ceptions
(∧(\s)∗((if)|(require))(\s)∗(\()(.)∗((\w)|(\()|(\))|(\[)|(\])|(.))((send)|(delegatecall)|(call)|(callcode))(.)∗
(\()(.) ∗ (\))(.) ∗ (\)))
(2.2)
Dos by external
contract
((if)|(require))(\s) ∗ (\()(.) ∗ (\.)(\w) + (\()(.) ∗ (\))(.) ∗ (\)) (2.3)
(for)(\s) ∗ (\()(.) ∗ (; )(.) + (\.)(\w) + (\()(.) ∗ (\))(.) ∗ (; )(.) ∗ (\)) (2.4)
Using tx.origin
for authentica-
tion
∧(\s) ∗ ((require)|(if))(\s) ∗ (\()(.) ∗ (tx.origin)(.) ∗ (\)) (2.5)
Missing
constructor
∧(\s) ∗ (constructor)(\s) ∗ (\() (2.6)
∧(\s) ∗ (function)(\s) ∗ (contractName)(\s) ∗ (\() (2.7)
Locked money
(\s) ∗ (function)(\s)(.) + (\))(.) ∗ (\s)(payable)((\s)|(\{)|(; )) (2.8)
(\.)((transfer)|(send))(\s) ∗ (\()(.) + (\)) (2.9)
(\.)(call)(\.)(\s) ∗ ((value)|(gas)(\(.) + (\))(\.)(value)))(\() (2.10)
(\b)((delegatecall)|(staticall)|(callvalue)|(call))(\s) ∗ (\() (2.11)
Unsafe type in-
ference
(\b)(var)(\b)(\s) + (\w) + (\s) ∗ (=)(\s) ∗ (\d) + (\b) (2.12)
byte[ ] (\s) ∗ (byte)(\s) ∗ (\[)(\s) ∗ (\])(\s) (2.13)
Costly loop
(\b)(for)(\s) ∗ (\()(.) ∗ (; )(.) ∗ (\.)(.) ∗ (; )(.) ∗ (\)) (2.14)
(\b)(while)(\s) ∗ (\()(.) ∗ (\.)(.) ∗ (\)) (2.15)
(\b)(for)(\s) ∗ (\()(.) ∗ (; )(.) ∗ (\w) + (.) ∗ (; )(.) ∗ (\)) (2.16)
(\b)(while)(\s) ∗ (\()(.) ∗ (\w) + (.) ∗ (\)) (2.17)
(\b)(for)(\s) ∗ (\()(.) ∗ (; )(.) ∗ (\()(.) ∗ (\))(.) ∗ (; )(.) ∗ (\)) (2.18)
(\b)(while)(\s) ∗ (\()(.) ∗ (\()(.) ∗ (\))(.) ∗ (\)) (2.19)
Timestamp de-
pendence
(((\b)(now)(\b))|((\b)(block.timestamp)(\b))) (2.20)
Token API
violation
(\s) ∗ ((contract)|(interface))(\s) + (\w) ∗ ((ERC)|(ERc)|(eRC)|(eRc)|(ErC)|(Erc)|(erC)|(erc))((20)|
(721)|(165))(\w) ∗ ((\s)|({)|(; )) (2.21)
(\s)∗(function)(\s)+(\b)((transfer)|(transferFrom)|(arrrove)|(supportsInterface)|(isApprovedFo
rAll))(\b) (2.22)
Using fixed
point number
type
(\b)((unfixed)(fixed))((\d){1, 3}(x)(\d){0, 2})?(\s) + (\w)+ (2.23)
Private
modifier
(\b)(private)(\b) (2.24)
(\b)(fcuntion)(\b) (2.25)
Redundant re-
fusal of pay-
ment
(\b)(function)(\s) ∗ (\()(\s) ∗ (\))(.) ∗ (\s) + (payable)(\s)∗ (2.26)
Compiler
version
problem
(\s) ∗ (pragma)(\s) + (solidity)(\s) + (\∧)(\d)(\.)(\d)(\.)(\d)(\s) ∗ (; ) (2.27)
(\s) ∗ (pragma)(\s) + (solidity)(\s) + (\ >)(\ =)(\d)(\.)(\d)(\.)(\d) (2.28)
(\s) ∗ (pragma)(\s) + (experimental)(\s)+ (2.29)
Style guide
violation
(\b)(function)(\s) + [∧a− z](\w)+ (2.30)
(\s) ∗ (event)(\s) + [∧A− Z](\w)+ (2.31)
(\b)(\w) + (\s) + (\[)(.) ∗ (\]) (2.32)
Integer division (\d) + (\s) ∗ (\/)(\s) ∗ (\d)+ (2.33)
Implicit
visibility level
∧(\s) ∗ ((uint)|(int))(\d){0, 3}(\s) + (\w)+ (2.34)
∧(\s) ∗ ((ufixed)|(fixed))((\d){1, 3}(x)(\d){0, 2})?(\ (2.35)
∧(\s) ∗ (bool)(\s) + (\w)+ (2.36)
∧(\s) ∗ (address)(\s) + (\w)+ (2.37)
∧(\s) ∗ (mapping)(\s) ∗ (\()(\s) ∗ (\w) + (\ (2.38)
∧(\s) ∗ (((bytes){0, 2})|(byte))(\s) + (\w)+ (2.39)
∧(\s) ∗ (string)(\s)+ (2.40)
∧(\s) ∗ (\w) + (\s) ∗ (\[)(.) ∗ (\])(\s)+ (2.41)
